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ABSTRACT 
 
Five Crossroads on the Way to Basic Income: 
An Italian Tour* 
 
The current Italian income support policies are defective with respect to both efficiency and 
equity. A more effective design must face five crucial choices: universal vs. categorical 
policies; transfers vs. subsidies; unconditional vs. means-tested policies; coverage; flat vs. 
progressive tax rules. Using a microeconometric model and a social welfare methodology, we 
simulate the effects of 30 versions of three basic types: guaranteed minimum income, 
unconditional basic income and wage. The simulation preserves fiscal neutrality and adopts a 
methodology that allows for market equilibrium and ensures a consistent comparative statics 
interpretation of the results. The social welfare optimal policy is an unconditional transfer 
coupled with a wage subsidy, with a total benefit amounting to about 70% of the poverty 
level, or – depending on the social welfare criterion – a pure unconditional transfer amounting 
to 100% of the poverty level. 
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system when preparing the data set for estimating the microeconometric model. EUROMOD is a tax-
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we explore the feasibility and the optimal features of a universal 
policy of income support in Italy. The empirical evidence (e.g. Baldini et al. 2002, 
Aaberge et al. 2004,  Sacchi 2005, Colonna and Marcassa 2012, Baldini and Toso 
2013) suggests that the current Italian income support policies are defective with 
respect to both efficiency goals (e.g. supporting labour mobility) and equity goals 
(e.g. reducing poverty and economic insecurity) and because of the lack of a basic 
universal support mechanism. Moreover, since 2008 the economic crisis has put 
much stress on the current policies, confirming their shortcomings and stimulating 
a debate on the need for a redesign.1 This paper is meant to provide an empirical 
contribution to the debate. In principle the formulation of the problem is provided 
by optimal taxation theory, i.e. we aim at designing an income support mechanism 
that replaces the actual policies and maximizes a given social welfare function 
subject to a public budget constraint. However, instead of looking for an 
analytical solution we adopt a computational-empirical approach.  Namely, we 
use a microeconometric model and a social welfare methodology in order we 
explore and evaluate various alternatives mechanisms.2 In illustrating the 
motivations, the methods and the results, we will refer to five issues that emerge 
as crucial in the analysis of reforms, whether hypothetical or implemented. 
1. Is a universal income support mechanism feasible and desirable as an 
alternative to the categorical and selective current policies? We will investigate 
whether universalistic reforms are feasible with respect to the public budget 
constraint and desirable according to a social welfare criterion.  
2. Should the mechanism consist of a transfer or a subsidy or a combination 
of the two? Most numerical simulations done with the model of Mirrlees (1971) 
suggest as an optimal system a tax-transfer schedule with a lump-sum transfer, 
very high marginal tax rates on low income and almost constant marginal tax rates 
on average and high income. This scenario seems to have inspired many reforms 
(implemented or discussed) in the three decades 1970-80-90.  A second scenario 
emerges at the end of the 90s, with contributions (e.g. Diamond 1998 and Saez 
2001, 2002) that make Mirrlees’ model more amenable to econometric 
applications, e.g. Immervoll et al. (2007), Haan et al. (2007), Blundell et al. 
(2009). A frequent result emerging from these empirical exercises – based on 
Saez (2002)’s theoretical model -  is the superiority of policies such as in-work 
benefits, or tax-credit on low earnings. Analogous policies have been in part 
implemented or considered as alternatives to mean-tested transfers in various 
                                                 
1
 In 2012 the Italian Parliament has introduced a reform of labour market and income support 
policies. Although the reform is being declared as inspired by more universalistic principles and it 
contains indeed some move toward that direction, so far it does not seem to change the basic 
characteristics of the current system.   
2
 The approach is close to Fortin et al. (1993) and Aaberge et al. (2004). More complex exercises, 
where a social welfare index is maximized with respect to the parameters of the tax rule, within a 
class of piecewise-linear rules, are presented by Aaberge and Colombino (2012, 2013) and 
Blundell and Shephard (2012). A project specifically focussed on a flexible computational 
optimization of income support policies is illustrated in Colombino (2012). 
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countries during the last decade.3 Although nothing prevents the design of 
mechanisms that combine the transfers and subsidies, the theoretical nature of the 
optimal taxation literature (even in its empirical applications) in practice has 
forced the analysis to address transfer-based and subsidy-based mechanisms as if 
they were strictly alternative. In what follows we consider transfer-based, 
subsidy-based and mixed policies.  
3. Should a transfer be unconditional or conditional (mean-tested)? 
Theoretical contributions tend to be ambiguous: for example Besley (1990) 
concludes for the superiority of mean-testing, while Sadka et al. (1982) favour 
unconditional policies. The transfers mentioned at point 2) are typically 
conditional. However, the alternative of unconditional transfers deserves 
consideration at least because by construction avoids “poverty traps” and entails 
low administrative costs.4  Moreover, recent ex-post reform evaluations 
(Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock 2002) and experimental evidence (Standing 2008, 
Blattman et al. 2013) suggest that unconditional transfers might promote more 
efficient choices in education, production and occupational career. Given the 
model and the data used, our study will only be able to throw light on the issues of 
the relative redistributive performance, the poverty trap and the incentives to 
participation; however, the evidence mentioned above strongly motivates the 
interest in analysing the alternative conditional/unconditional policies. 
4. How generous should the policy be? The typical level of a guaranteed 
income (in proposed or implemented reforms) – either as a transfer or though a 
subsidy – is not larger than the poverty level and in most cases is much lower, 
mainly because the mechanisms are usually designed as complementary with 
respect to other welfare and social policies. In this paper we will investigate the 
performance of transfers or subsidies of different amounts up to the Poverty 
Level.  
5. Should taxes (that also finance the income support mechanism) be 
progressive or flat? Universal transfers have been frequently proposed together 
with the flat-tax (e.g. Atkinson 1995). The transfer makes the system progressive 
anyway, even when coupled with a flat tax rate (which is attractive on its own for 
its simplicity and transparency). A different motivation for the flat tax is that it 
promises to counterbalance the costs and/or the (supposedly) negative incentives 
coming from income support with better incentive to labour supply for the 
(supposedly) most productive fraction of the population. These last motivations 
must be checked against many arguments in favour of progressive marginal rates 
(e.g. Diamond and Saez 2011), in particular, among them, the empirical evidence 
upon the intensive and extensive labour supply elasticities (e.g. Aaberge and 
Colombino 1999, 2004, 2013; Meghir and Phillips 2008). In our simulation 
                                                 
3
 Recent empirical analysis of the effects of policies such as in-work benefits or tax credits 
include, among others, Fang and  Keane (2004) for the US, Francesconi et al. (2009) for the UK 
and Aaberge and Flood (2008) for Sweden. 
4
 Studies of the US found that administrative costs of unconditional programs are 2.5% 
compared to a range 4.8% - 13.5%  for means tested programs (van de Walle and Neads, 
Eds., 1996). 
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exercise both flat-tax and progressive-tax versions of the alternative income 
support mechanisms are analysed.  
  
6 
 
2. The reforms 
We simulate and evaluate alternative hypothetical reforms that replace the actual 
tax-transfer system. They are stylized cases representative of the different 
scenarios that are discussed or even actually implemented in many countries. A 
key parameter in the definition of the policies is the threshold G defined as 
follows. Let 
ix = total net available income (current) of household i (including both couples 
and singles). 
iN = total number of components of household i. 
Define the “individual-equivalent” income: i i ix x N=ɶ  and the Poverty Line
( )median 2P x= ɶ . Then i iG aP N= , where a is a proportion. The “square root 
scale” is one of the equivalence scales commonly used in OECD publications. For 
each reform we simulate three versions with different values of a: 1, 0.75 and 
0.50. For example, G = 0.5P 3  means that for a household with 3 components 
the threshold is ½ of the Poverty Line times the equivalence scale 3 . 
Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI). Each individual receives a transfer equal 
to G – I if single or G/2 – I if partner in a couple provided I < G (or I < G/2), 
where I denotes individual taxable income. This is the standard conditional (or 
means-tested) income support mechanism, close to a Negative Income Tax 
(Friedman 1962; Tobin 1966) with a 100% marginal reduction rate.  
Unconditional Basic Income (UBI). Each individual receives an unconditional 
transfer equal to G if single or G/2 if partner in a couple. It is the basic version of 
the system discussed for example by Van Parijs (1995) and also known in the 
policy debate as “citizen income” or “social dividend” (Meade 1995; Van Trier 
1995). 
Wage Subsidy (WS). Each individual receives a 10% subsidy on the gross hourly 
wage and her/his income is not taxed as long as her/his gross income (including 
the subsidy) does not exceed G if single or G/2 if partner in a couple. In essence, 
this is close to various in-work benefits or tax-credits reforms introduced in the 
USA (Earned Income Tax Credit), in the UK (In-Work Benefits) and recently also 
in Sweden. Figari (2011), Colonna and Marcassa (2012) and De Luca et al. (2012) 
simulate the performance of hypothetical reforms of the in-work benefit or tax-
credit type in Italy. 
GMI + WS and UBI + WS are mixed mechanisms where the transfer is 
complemented by the wage subsidy: in these cases the threshold G is reset as 
0.5G. A mixed system close to GMI+WS is proposed by De Vincenti and Paladini 
(2009). 
For each of the above five types we distinguish two versions: a flat tax version, in 
which the tax rule applied to incomes above G for singles or G/2 for the partners 
of couple is a fixed proportion t; a progressive tax version, in which the tax rule is 
progressive and replicates the current system with marginal tax rates 
proportionally adjusted according to a constant . The parameters t and  are 
endogenously determined within the reform simulation so that the total net tax 
revenue is equal to the one collected under the current tax-transfer system. 
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Altogether we have 5 (types) × 3 (values of a) × 2 (tax rules) = 30 reforms. We 
chose to consider a large set of general reform design since we think this approach 
is more appropriate for the current status of the debate in Italy: more explorative 
rather than focussed on a specific policy. The Appendix provides a more detailed 
description of the reforms by specifying net available income as a function of 
taxable income.  
 
3. The microeconometric model 
3.1.  Household behaviour 
The basic modelling framework belongs to the Random Utility family. We will 
consider households with two decision-makers (couples) or one decision-maker 
(singles). In both cases the decision-makers are aged 20 – 55 and are not retired 
nor students. Of course there might be other people in the household, but their 
behaviour is taken as exogenous. We adopt a “unitary” representation of the 
household decision process.5 Couple n is assumed to solve the following problem 
 ( )
, ,
max ( , , , )
s.t.
, ,
( , , )
F M
n
F Mh h j
F M
n n n
F F M M
U C h h j
h h j
C R w h w h y
∈Ω
=
  (1) 
where 
( ), , ,n F MU C h h j  = utility function 
gh = average weekly hours of work required by the chosen job in the choice set 
for partner of gender g = F (female) or M (male); 
n
gw = hourly wage rate of partner g; 
ny  = vector of exogenous household gross incomes; 
C  = net disposable household income; 
j  = unobserved (by the analyst) characteristics of the household-job match; 
Ω = opportunity set containing jobs ( , ,F Mh h j ), including those with 
0 and/or 0F Mh h= = ; 
R = tax-transfer rule that transforms gross incomes into net available household 
income.  
The first two constraints of problem (1) say that the hours of work gh
 
are chosen 
within a discrete set of values A including also 0 hours. This discrete set of values 
can be interpreted as the actual choice set (maybe determined by institutional 
constraints) or as approximations to the true (possibly continuous) choice set. The 
                                                 
5
 We did not adopt the alternative “collective” approach (e.g. Vermeulen 2006) because of its 
severe identification requirements (at least with our available data). Moreover, the typical 
empirical strategy adopted with the collective approach (the so-called decentralized – sharing rule 
specification) raises some doubts about its applicability to tax reform evaluation problems, since it 
requires convex opportunity sets and it does not provide a structural representation of the 
household decision process. 
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third constraint says that net income C is the result of a tax-transfer rule R applied 
to gross incomes.  
We write the utility function ( , , , )n F MU C h h ε as the sum of a parametric 
systematic part and a random component: 
 U ( , , , ) ( ( , , ), , , ; ) ( )n n n n nF M F F M M F MC h h j V R w h w h y h h Z jθ ε= +  (2) 
  
where nZ  is a vector of household characteristics, θ  is a vector of parameters to 
be estimated and  the random variable ε accounts for characteristics of the job-
household match that are observed by the household but not by the researcher 
(McFadden 1974). 
We denote with ( , )F Mp h h the relative frequency (or probability density function) 
of jobs of type ( , )F Mh h ∈ Ω . The random variable ε is assumed to be i.i.d. Type I 
Extreme Value. By specifying ( , )F Mp h h as “uniform with peaks”, it turns out that 
we can write the probability that household n subject to tax-transfer regime R 
chooses ,F Mh f h m= = as follows:6 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
4 4
1 1
4 4
, 1 1
exp ( , , ), , , ;
( , ; , )
exp ( , , ), , , ;
   
F M
n n n n
F M Fk Fk Mk Mk
n k k
n n n n
F F M M F M Fk Fk F Mk Mk M
h h k k
V R w f w m y f m Z D f D m
P f m R
V R w h w h y h h Z D h D h
θ γ γ
θ
θ γ γ
= =
= =
+ +
=
+ +
 
 
 
 
 
 
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 (3) 
where  
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
2
3
4
1 if  17   32  
            
0 otherwise
1 if  33   48  
           
0 otherwise
1 if  49    
           
0 otherwise
1 if 0    
            
0 otherwise
           w
g
g g
g
g g
g
g g
g
g g
h
D h
h
D h
h
D h
h
D h
≤ ≤
= 

≤ ≤
= 

≤
= 

<
= 

ith g = F (female) or M (male).
 (4) 
 
In a similar way, a single s of gender g is assumed to solve a constrained utility 
maximization problem as follows: 
                                                 
6
 See for example Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999), Dagsvik (2000a), Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) and 
Colombino (2013). 
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,
max ( , , )
s.t.
( , )
( , )
s
gh j
g
s s
U C h j
h j
C R w h y
∈Ω
=
 (5) 
where 
h = average weekly hours of work required by the chosen job. 
In this case, the utility function ( , , )sgU C h j  will be written as follows: 
 
              ( , ; ) ( ( , ), , ; ) ( )s s s sg gU C h j V R w h y h Z jθ ε= +  (6) 
Proceeding as we did with couples we end up with: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
4
1
4
1
exp ( , ), , ;
( ; , , )
exp ( , ), , ;
s s s
g gk gk
s k
g g
s s s
g gk gk
h k
V R w g y g Z D g
P g R
V R w h y h Z D h
θ γ
θ γ
θ γ
=
=
 
+ 
 
=
 
+ 
 
∑
∑ ∑
 (7) 
As shown in Colombino (2013), coefficients of the dummies can be given the 
following interpretation, which turns out to be useful for the development of the 
equilibrium simulation procedure (Section 4.1): 
 
4
,
, 1,2,3.
g
gk
g
gk g
e J
e J J k
γ
γ
∝
∝ =
 (8) 
where gJ is the number of market jobs available in gender g’s opportunity set and 
gkJ is the number of market jobs with hours h such that ( ) 1gkD h = .7 When 
computing (3) and (7), the set of hours values is approximated by a discrete set 
containing the value 0 plus ten values randomly chosen from the ten intervals of 
weekly hours 1-8, 9-16, 17-24, 25-32, 33-40, 41-48, 49-56, 57-64, 65-72, 73-80. 
Therefore the singles’ and the couples’ opportunity sets contain respectively 11 
and 121 alternatives.8  In order to compute net household income C  for each 
alternative we use the EUROMOD Microsimulation model.9 First, EUROMOD is 
used to generate the gross incomes since the Italian data are originally collected as 
net incomes. Gross wage rates are computed  by dividing gross earning by hours 
of work. Given the gross wage rates, we compute gross earnings and  incomes at 
each point in the choice set. Finally, EUROMOD is used again to compute net 
                                                 
7
 Expressions (3) and (7) are close to other multinomial logit models “augmented” by alternative-
specific dummies (e.g. Van Soest, 1995; Kornstad and Thoresen, 2007). Here however we adopt a 
specific structural interpretation of the dummies’ coefficients according to expression (8). 
8
 A comparison and evaluation of different procedures to specify the choice set is provided by 
Aaberge et al. (2009).  
9
 EUROMOD is a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European Union that enables 
researchers and policy analysts to calculate, in a comparable manner, the effects of taxes and 
benefits on household incomes and work incentives for the population of each country and for the 
EU as a whole. EUROMOD was originally designed by a research team under the direction of 
Holly Sutherland at the Department of Economics in Cambridge, UK. It is now developed and 
updated at the Microsimulation Unit at ISER, Essex, U.K. 
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income C at each point in the choice set. Wage rates are assumed to be 
independent of hours of work required on the various jobs available in the choice 
set.10 
For the observations with missing data on earnings and/or hours of work, gross 
wage rates are imputed on the basis of a wage equation estimated on the 
subsample with data on earnings and hours and corrected for sample selection. 
The procedure for selection-correction follows Dagsvik (2000b) and is compatible 
with assuming the same process for the selection of the subsample and the labour 
supply decision, although it does not a priori constrain the two processes to be 
identical.11 The random component of the wage equation is taken into account 
when computing C and other quantities involving the wage rate and is integrated-
out with a simulation procedure. 
  
3.2. Empirical specification of preferences 
We choose a quadratic specification since it represents a good compromise 
between flexibility and ease of estimation:       
 
2 2 2
2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
         ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
n
C F F M M CC FF F MM M
CF M CM M FM F M
s
C g g CC gg g Cg g
V C T h T h C T h T h
C T h C T h T h T h
V C T h C T h C T h
θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ
= + − + − + + − + − +
+ − + − + − −
= + − + + − + −
 (9) 
where  nV  and  sV  denote the systematic part of the utility function respectively 
for couples and singles and T denotes total available time.  
Some of the above parameters sθ  are made dependent on characteristics:  
                                                 
10
 Since also the self-employed are included in the sample, it might be important to drop the 
independence assumption. We tried to estimate different wage rate functions for different hour 
intervals but we did not obtain satisfactory results. We can add that we also estimated the model 
and run some simulations on the wage-employed subsample and we did not obtain important 
differences. 
11
 The estimates of the wage equation are not reported here and are available upon request from 
the author.  It is possible to adopt a simultaneous method of estimation even without restricting the 
two processes to be identical. However we do not think that a simultaneous method is obviously 
superior, although in principle it is more efficient than two-step procedures. While the likelihood 
of the Conditional Logit model has nice properties and ensures an easy convergence of the 
estimates, the same is not necessarily true of a likelihood that incorporates a wage function to be 
estimated. Our personal experience with both simultaneous and two-step procedures in practice 
speaks in favour of the latter as more flexible and robust. 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
2
0 1 2
3 4 5
2
0 1 2
3 4
Age of the wife Age of the wife
        + #Children #Children under 6 (#Children 6-10)
Age of the husband Age of the husband
         + #Children #Children unde
F F F F
F F F
M M M M
M M
θ β β β
β β β
θ β β β
β β
= + + +
+ +
= + + +
+ ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
5
2
0 1 2
3 4 5
0 1
r 6 (#Children 6-10)
Age Age
    #Children #Children under 6 (#Children 6-10)
(Household's size).
M
g g g g
g g g
C C C
β
θ β β β
β β β
θ β β
+
= + + +
+ + +
= +
 (10) 
Notice that the parameters are estimated separately for couples, single females 
and single males. 
 
3.3. Data and estimates 
For the estimation and simulation exercise we use a EUROMOD dataset based on 
the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) 1998. More recent datasets 
are of course available. However, from the perspective of the policy simulations, 
pre-2001 data might be preferable since they do not suffer from the turbulent 
macroeconomic scenarios that characterize the post-2001 years. Since 1998 the 
basic structure of the tax-transfer system has remained essentially the same, a part 
from some adjustments in marginal tax rates and in the amount of some transfers. 
The inclusion criteria are as follows: 
- Couple and single households; 
- Employed (self-employed included), unemployed or inactive (students and 
disabled are excluded); 
- Both partners of couple households and heads of single households aged 
20 – 55. 
The Maximum Likelihood estimates based on the sample of couples, single men 
and single women (respectively 2955, 291 and 366 observations) are reported in 
Table 1.   
In order to illustrate the behavioural implications of the estimates, in Table 2 we 
present the labour supply (wage) elasticities by gender, family status and income 
decile. The elasticities are estimated by microsimulation: namely, we increment 
the gross wage rates by 1%, compute the change in expected worked hours 
individual by individual, aggregate the changes across the sample and then 
translate them into the elasticity measure. The Table confirms the common results 
of higher elasticities for the females (in particular married females) and elasticities 
inversely related to the level of income. 
[Table 2 approximately here] 
Table 3 documents the model’s fitting performance by comparing the observed 
and the simulated choices of alternative ranges of weekly hours of work. The 
ability to replicate the observed choice appears to be pretty good, somewhat less 
satisfactory for singles. 
[Table 3 approximately here] 
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Most of the observations at most of the points in the choice set satisfy the 
regularity conditions for the utility function (systematic part). In Table 4 we show, 
for couples and singles, the percentage of observations with utility function 
increasing in income, increasing in leisure and quasi-concave, when computed at 
the chosen alternative or at all the alternatives in the choice set. Most of the 
violations are concentrated on alternatives that are chosen by a small number of 
households. The regularity statistics at all alternatives in the choice set are 
particularly important in view of policy simulation and represent a much more 
severe test than the regularity statistics at the chosen alternative: yet the results 
turn out to be rather close for the two types of statistics. 
[Table 4 approximately here] 
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4. Policy simulation and evaluation 
4.1. The simulation procedure 
The simulation has two distinctive features that are not common in the tax reform 
literature.  
First, the reforms are simulated under the constraint of being fiscally neutral, i.e. 
they generate the same total net tax revenue as the 1998 system. The calibration 
parameters are a constant tax rate t in the Flat tax systems and a proportional 
change τ of the current marginal tax rates in the Progressive tax systems.  
Second, the simulation is conducted under equilibrium conditions. We adopt a 
procedure – fully explained in Colombino (2013) – that is specifically appropriate 
for the microeconometric model. The model adopts the widely used refinement 
consisting of introducing alternative-specific constants, which should account for 
a number of factors such as the different density or accessibility of different types 
of jobs, search or fixed costs and systematic utility components otherwise not 
accounted for.12 However, the authors adopting the “dummies refinement” so far 
have performed the simulations while leaving the dummies’ coefficients γ ’s 
unchanged when computing the new choice probabilities according to expressions 
(3) and (7). The policy simulation is most commonly interpreted as a comparative 
statics exercise, where different equilibria – induced  by different tax-transfer 
regimes – are compared. We claim that the standard procedure in general is not 
consistent with the comparative statics interpretation.  Since the γ ’s reflect – at 
least in part – the number and the composition of available jobs (see expression 
(8)) and since the number of people willing to work and their distribution across 
different job types in general change as a consequence of the reforms, it follows 
that in general the γ ’s must also change, at least if we adopt a basic notion of 
equilibrium requiring that the number of people willing to work must equal to the 
number of available jobs. In this exercise we assume that the number of available 
jobs depends on the average wage rate according to a constant labour demand 
elasticity (here set equal to -1).13  Changes s in the wage rates induce changes in 
the number of available jobs, in the coefficients γ’s (according to expression (8) 
and in the choice probabilities. In the course of the simulation the wage rate 
distributions and the coefficients γ’s are iteratively adjusted so that the number of 
available jobs is equal to the number of people choosing to work.  
Overall, the simulation requires a two-level procedure. At the “low” level, 
household choices are simulated given the wage rates, the γ’s  and the tax-transfer 
parameters. At the “high” level, the wage rates, the γ’s  and the tax-transfer 
parameters are iteratively adjusted so that the total net tax revenue remains 
constant and the equilibrium conditions are satisfied. 
                                                 
12
 See for example Van Soest (1995), Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999, 2000, 2004), Aaberge and 
Colombino (2013), Kalb (2000), Dagsvik and Strøm (2006), Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) and 
Colombino et al. (2010). 
13
 Most of the empirical estimates of the long run labour demand elasticity belong to a range of 
values close to -1 or -0.5. Colombino (2013) compares the simulation results for various different 
values of the labour demand elasticity. 
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The estimated model simulates the effects of alternative hypothetical tax-transfer 
reforms upon variables such as the number of employed, the taxes paid etc. There 
are many possible methods that can be used to compute these predictions. We 
adopt the method of computing the expected value. Let ( , ; , , )nP f m Rθ γ  be the 
probability that household n chooses ( , )f m under the R  tax-transfer regime, 
computed on the basis of the estimated parameters. Suppose we are interested in 
simulating the expected value of some function ( , )n f mψ of the choices made. 
We compute the expected value of that variable after the policy is implemented as 
follows:     
 
( , )
( ( , )) ( , ) ( , , ; , , )n n n n
f m
E f m f m P f m Z Rψ ψ θ γ
∈Ω
= ∑ . (11) 
An analogous procedure is used for singles.   
 
4.2. Social evaluation  
We define two Social Welfare functions. They require the following steps. 
1) Compute the expected maximum utility attained by household n under tax-
transfer regime R:14 
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 (12) 
2) Compute the interpersonally-comparable-metric utility of household i under tax 
regime R, ( ).i Rµ Let 0 0( )V R be the expected maximum utility attained by a 
reference household under a reference tax-transfer regime. In this paper we 
choose as reference household the poorest single and as reference tax-transfer 
system the current system: 
 ( ) 40 0 0 00 0
1
( ) ln exp ( , ), , ; , ( )k k
h k
V R V R w h y h Z D hθ γ γ
=
  
= +  
  
∑ ∑  (13) 
The interpersonally-comparable money-metric utility of household n under tax 
regime R, ( )n Rµ , is then defined by: 
 ( ) 40
1
ln exp ( ), , ; , ( ) ( ).n nk k
h k
V R h Z D h V Rµ θ γ γ
=
  
+ =  
  
∑ ∑  (14) 
In other words, ( )n Rµ is the net available income needed by the reference 
household under the reference tax-transfer regime in order to attain the same 
                                                 
14
 For the derivation of the expression for the expected maximum utility see McFadden (1978) and 
Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985). The same methodology for empirical welfare evaluation is used by 
Colombino (1998). 
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expected maximum utility level of household n under tax-transfer regime R: it is 
analogous to the “equivalent income” as defined by King (1983). 
3) Last, the Gini Social Welfare (GSW) function and the Poverty-adjusted Social 
Welfare (PAGSW) function are computed as follows:  
 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) 1 ( )
( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
GSW R R I R
PAGSW R R I R p R
µ
µ
= −
= − −
 (15) 
where:  
1( ) ( ),n
n
R R
N
µ µ= ∑
 
( )I R = Gini coefficient of the sample distribution of ( ),n Rµ  
p(R) = head-count poverty ratio.15 
The Social Welfare indexes explicitly incorporate the efficiency-equity trade-off. 
Efficiency is measured by ( )Rµ , while Equity is measured by 1 – I(R) or by 1 – 
I(R) – p(R).  
5. Results 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 illustrate the main welfare evaluation results. In Table 5 the 
policies  are ranked – the most preferred on top – according to the Social Welfare 
functions presented in section 4. Each reform is identified by three pieces of 
information: the income support mechanism (GMI etc.), the Flat (F) or 
Progressive (P) tax rule and the coverage i.e. the value of a (0.5, 0.75 or 1) as 
defined in section 2. For example, UBI+WS_F_0.75 denotes a policy where the 
income support mechanism is UBI+WS, the tax rule is Flat and 0.75 .G P N=  
Hereafter the comments to the results are organized along the five issues 
mentioned in the introduction.
 
Universal vs. categorical policies. Most reforms rank better, social welfare wise, 
than the current system under both social welfare criteria. The results are 
definitively in favour of universalistic reforms as compared with the current 
categorical policies. Of course this does not imply that we could not design even 
better categorical policies: the question we are answering here is whether we can 
improve upon the current policies by moving towards universalism.  
Transfer-based vs. subsidy-based policies. The top positions in the rankings of 
Table 5 are taken by transfer-based mechanisms or by mixed policies envisaging 
both transfers and subsidies. Under this respect, we observe a marked difference 
between the GSW criterion and the PAGSW criterion. The former criterion 
favours the mixed policy UBI+WS while the latter favours a pure UBI. From 
Table 7 we learn that pure transfer-based policies have a mild impact on labour 
supply and a major impact on the poverty ratio. Under GMI, female (male) labour 
supply is on average 963 (1957) compared to 973 (1978) under the current system 
and analogously under UBI we get 956 (1960); however, GMI and UBI reforms 
                                                 
15
 See Aaberge (2007) for the GSW and Atkinson (1987) for the PAGSW. The formulation we 
adopt for the PAGSW implies giving the same weight to a percentage point of the Gini index and 
to a percentage point of the head-count poverty ratio. 
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push down the poverty ratio respectively to 1.23 and 0.5 (compared to current 
4.23). WS reforms produce a modest increase in labour supply (respectively 979.5 
for females and 1967 for males) but are much less effective in reducing the 
poverty ratio, which goes down from 4.23 to 3.88. Mixed policies produce effects 
somewhat in between pure transfer and pure subsidy policies.   
Unconditional vs. means-tested policies. According the social welfare rankings 
of Table 5, unconditional systems (UBI or UBI+WS) are preferable to conditional 
ones. This result can be explained by observing (Table 7) that the greater 
generosity of the unconditional transfers is compensated by the lack of poverty-
trap effects, with the following implications: UBI or UBI+WS policies provide on 
average an annual benefit of 6433 euros compared to 4250 euros provided by 
GMI or GMI+WS; at the same time, both unconditional and conditional policies 
induce essentially the same amount of labour; marginal tax rates required for 
fiscal neutrality are modestly higher for unconditional policies as compared to 
conditional ones; most important UBI or UBI+WS perform better in reducing 
poverty. 
Coverage. Under GSW, the transfer should cover 75% of the poverty line: this 
result is somewhat consistent with the actual design of income support policies. 
However, under the PAGSW the coverage should be 100% of the poverty line, 
which suggests that the implicit social welfare criterion underlying the actual or 
currently suggested policies is closer to GSW than to PAGSW.  
Progressive vs. flat taxes. Progressive taxes rank best. A contribution to this 
result comes from the pattern of wage elasticity of labour supply, as in Table 2: 
higher income households are much less elastic than lower income ones.16  
[Table 5 approximately here] 
In Table 6 we report the result of regressing the value of GWF or PAGWS against 
a set of variables measuring the key features of the tax-transfer systems. The 
regressions help to identify the welfare contribution of policy attributes. Under the 
GSW criterion, the results confirm that the progressivity of the tax rule and the 
non-conditionality of the income support mechanism have a significant positive 
effect. The coverage a has a positive marginal effect up to around 0.70. The 
picture produced by the PAGSW criterion is partially different. Coverage has a 
positive marginal effect even above 1. The effects of Progressive and 
Unconditional are positive as under the GSW, but less significant. Instead the 
effect of Subsidy is negative and significant. This last results can be explained as 
follows. PAGSW give a lot of weight to the Poverty rate. It turn out that transfers 
are more effective than subsidies in reducing poverty. The policies are designed 
so that when a subsidy is introduced, the transfer is reduced (or eliminated). The 
overall consequence is that the effect of Subsidy turns out to be negative under 
PAGSW.  
In summary, the indications for a best mechanism converge on UBI+WS_P_0.75 
(under the GSW criterion) or UBI_P_1 (under the PAGSW criterion).  
[Table 6 approximately here] 
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 A recent survey by Diamond and Saez (2011) gives support to the superiority of progressive 
taxes.    
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Table 7 helps identifying what specific features the best mechanisms have and 
how they fare from the perspective of other possibly relevant criteria, such as top 
marginal tax rates or behavioural effects.  UBI+WS_P_0.75 (UBI_P_1) envisages 
an average annual benefit (transfer + subsidy) per household of 8640 (12720) 
Euros 1998, which represent about 70% (100%) of the Poverty Level. This 
amount is to be compared with the 101 Euros of the CURRENT system.17 The 
percentages of utility-winners and of income-winners are respectively 69 (57) and 
65 (58). The percentage poverty rate (head count) is 0.9 (0), to be compared to 
4.23 under the CURRENT system.  
All the reforms require an increase of marginal tax rates. UBI+WS_P_0.75 
requires an 11% increase of the current (1998) marginal tax rates, which means a 
51% top marginal tax rate. Under the same scenario UBI_P_1 requires a 60% top 
marginal tax rate. These figures are high but not at all unrealistic. For example in 
2009 the top marginal tax rates in Denmark and Sweden were respectively around 
62% and 57%. If the above tax rates were judged for some reasons not feasible 
(possibly from the point of view of political consensus), it should be noticed that 
the menu of welfare improving reforms is very large. For example, the flat version 
UBI+WS_F_0.75 would require a 42% flat rate. Therefore we are left we many 
reforms to choose among according to different criteria or constraints. Moreover, 
instead of increasing the marginal tax rates on income one might think of a 
different structure of taxation e.g. increasing taxes on wealth and on (selected) 
consumption expenditures.  
The effects on labour supply, negligible for males, are modest for females as well, 
with small reductions of hours worked except when WS is implemented. As 
already noted above, by comparing GMI and UBI we see the effect of the poverty 
trap, present with GMI but not with UBI: the latter pays average benefits three 
times larger than the former and yet the effect on hours worked is essentially the 
same. The incentive effect on hours worked of WS, alone or coupled with GMI or 
UBI, emerges also rather clearly. 
With the exception of GMI_F_1 and GMI_P_1, all the reforms imply a 
percentage of winners above 50% and would therefore win a referendum against 
the status quo.  
The transfer-based policies (UBI and GMI) are the most effective ones in 
reducing poverty. WS leads to poverty rates closer to the status quo. Mixed 
policies (UBI+WS and GMI+WS) are located somehow half-way between WS 
and the current system.   
[Table 7 approximately here] 
6. Conclusions 
We used a microeconometric model of labour supply and a social evaluation 
methodology in order to identify feasible and welfare-improving universalistic 
income support mechanisms in Italy. We considered five type of mechanism: 
GMI, UBI, WS, GMI+WS and UBI+WS. Each one has three variants, depending 
on the degree of coverage with respect to the poverty line: 50%, 75% and 100%. 
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 The 101 Euros transfer in the CURRENT system is just the average of various categorical, 
conditional or local transfers and benefits (such as unemployment benefits, “cassa integrazione”, 
family benefits etc.). 
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Moreover, each type can be coupled either with Flat tax rule or with a Progressive 
Tax rule. In total we have 5×3×2 = 30 possible reforms. The tax parameter (either 
the constant flat rate in the Flat rule or the proportional change in the marginal tax 
rates with respect to the current (1998) system in the Progressive rule) is 
determined endogenously so that the total net tax revenue remains as under the 
current system. The simulation adopts a methodology that allows for market 
equilibrium and ensures a consistent comparative statics interpretation of the 
simulation results. Under the pure Gini Social Welfare criterion, the best policy is 
an unconditional basic income coupled with a wage subsidy (amounting to a total 
benefit close to 70% of the Poverty Level), while under the Poverty-Adjusted Gini 
criterion Social Welfare criterion the best policy is a pure unconditional transfer 
not lower than the Poverty Level.  More generally, universality, non-
conditionality, progressivity, and wage subsidies (under the GSW criterion) 
emerge as desirable attributes of an income support mechanism preferable to the 
current system based on categorical and means-tested policies. Evaluation criteria 
different from the ones chosen in this exercise might of course dictate a different 
ranking of the policies and different features of the best ones; however the set of 
policies that are preferable to the current system is very large and suggests the 
possibility of selecting a universalistic best reform according to many different 
criteria and constraints. 
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Appendix 
This Appendix provides a detailed descriptions of the reforms by specifying net 
available income as a function of taxable income. The symbols used are defined 
as follows. 
F F Fx w h= = female gross earnings;  
M M Mx w h= = male gross earnings;  
F Mx x x= + ; 
Fy = female unearned gross income;  
My = male unearned gross income; 
m = other household net income; 
FS = social security contributions (female);  
MS = social security contributions (male);  
F MS S S= + ; 
F F F FI g y S= + − =   taxable income (female);  
M M M MI g y S= + − =   taxable income (male);  
F MI I I= + ; 
P = poverty line;  
N = number of people in the household; 
G = αP N  with α = 1, 0.75, 0.50; 
FC =  net available income (female);  
MC =  net disposable income (male);  
F MC m C C= + + ; 
T = taxes paid by the household; 
B = benefits or transfers received by household; 
q = average propensity to consumption; 
r = average VAT rate;  
ω  = proportional subsidy on the gross wage rate;  
(.)ϕ = progressive tax function: it applies the 1998 marginal tax rates multiplied 
by a constant such that the fiscal neutrality constraint is satisfied, i.e. 
11 1 1 0 0 0 0T B r qC S T B r qC S− + + = − + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
where the superscript R denotes a generic reform and the superscript 0 denotes the 
current (1998) system. 
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The current (1998) marginal tax rates are as follows: 
Income Brackets Marginal Tax Rates 
0 –  7.7 18 
7.7 –  15.5 26 
15.5 –  31 33 
31 – 69.7 39 
> 69.7 45 
Income brackets (originally in Italian Lire) are expressed in thousands of Euros. 
Under the 1998 system the above rates are applied to personal earnings, together 
with deductions, allowances and benefits. Under the reforms all deductions, tax 
credits and benefits are cancelled, the income brackets are kept unchanged and the 
marginal tax rates (either the flat or the progressive ones) are applied to the whole 
personal income (not just to earnings).  
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 TABLES  
 Table 1. Parameter estimates 
  
 Couple Single female Single male 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
βF0 0.3302 0.0366 0.1563 0.0844   
βF1 -0.0078 0.0013 -0.0085 0.0034   
βF2 .1051×10-3 .0173×10-3 .1062×10-3 .0425×10-3   
βF3 0.0086 0.0016 0.0098 0.0062   
βF4 -0.0018 0.0022 -0.0026 0.0138   
βF5 0.0031 0.0023 0.0131 0.0137   
βM0 0.0338 0.0424   0.2237 0.0895 
βM1 0.0017 0.0019   -0.0053 0.0035 
βM2 -.0218×10-3 .0237×10-3   . 0694×10-3 . 0453×10-3 
βM3 0.0036 0.002   -0.0685 0.0368 
βM4 -0.0106 0.0029   0.0615 0.0592 
βM5 -0.0077 0.003   0.0635 0.0495 
βC0 .4311×10-3 .1284×10-3 -.1394×10-3 .3449×10-3 .2968×10-3 .3975×10-3 
βC1 -.0251×10-3 .0175×10-3 .0433×10-3 .0574×10-3 -.0642×10-3 .0792×10-3 
θCC -.9121×10-8 .4500×10-8 -.0142×10-6 .0246×10-6 -.8870×10-8 2.6900×10-8 
θFF -.8251×10-3 .2055×10-3 .8978×10-3 .4239×10-3   
θMM .3973×10-3 .1527×10-3   -.0417×10-3 .4962×10-3 
θCF -.1920×10-5 .0770×10-5 .0570×10-4 .0332×10-4   
θCM -.1010×10-5 .0030×10-5   -.1230×10-5 .4210×10-5 
θFM .1992×10-3 .0799×10-3     
γF1 3.0781 0.2208 4.0696 0.5614   
γF2 5.223 0.3015 7.0778 0.7957   
γF3 5.2606 0.3515 6.3633 0.9287   
γF4 -3.356 0.1714 -1.1311 0.3892   
γM1 3.6737 0.2608   2.9974 0.6701 
γM2 8.3143 0.3484   6.7868 0.9447 
γM3 8.9178 0.3948   7.2329 1.0857 
γM4 -0.8085 0.2018   -0.7927 0.487 
Log-Likelihood -9381 -643 -505 
No of observation 2955 366 291 
Pseudo-R2 33.81% 26.72% 27.69% 
 Table 2. Labour supply elasticities 
 
 
 Female  Male  
Decile of household 
income 
Own wage 
elasticities 
Cross 
elasticities 
Own wage 
elasticities 
Cross 
elasticities 
 
Singles 
I 2.88  0.62  
II - IX 0.19  0.12  
X 0.00  0.00  
 
Couples 
I 4.35   0.80 0.31   0.00 
II - IX 1.00 -0.20 0.10 -0.02 
X 0.13 -0.17 0.06 -0.02 
  
 Table 3. Observed and simulated labour supply choices. Proportion of households in 
each weekly hours bracket 
 
Weekly 
hours Female Male 
 Single Married  Single Married 
 Observed Simulated Observed Simulated Observed Simulated Observed Simulated 
0 0.169 0.169 0.477 0.477 0.086 0.086 0.049 0.049 
1-8 0.008 0.025 0.006 0.013 0.017 0.023 0.004 0.010 
9-16 0.025 0.007 0.016 0.008 0.014 0.009 0.010 0.003 
17-24 0.109 0.140 0.089 0.100 0.048 0.067 0.030 0.040 
25-32 0.079 0.049 0.063 0.052 0.045 0.026 0.022 0.013 
33-40 0.462 0.376 0.261 0.207 0.502 0.447 0.521 0.481 
41-48 0.074 0.159 0.034 0.088 0.117 0.172 0.141 0.181 
49-56 0.014 0.037 0.027 0.036 0.093 0.106 0.121 0.132 
57-64 0.036 0.019 0.014 0.013 0.048 0.042 0.060 0.055 
65-72 0.014 0.011 0.008 0.004 0.017 0.017 0.027 0.025 
73-80 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.013 0.005 0.015 0.011 
 
Table 4. Regularity of the utility function (systematic part) 
 
 
Percentage of 
observations with utility 
increasing w.r.t. leisure 
Percentage of 
observations with utility 
increasing w.r.t. income  
Percentage of observations with 
utility increasing w.r.t. income and 
quasi-concave 
 
At the 
chosen 
alternative 
At all 
alternatives 
in the 
choice set 
At the 
chosen 
alternative 
At all 
alternatives 
in the 
choice set 
At the chosen 
alternative 
At all 
alternatives in 
the choice set 
Singles 100.0 100.0 94.0 91.0 90.9 88.3 
Couples     100.0      100.0 96.6 96.4 94.3 91.6 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5. Ranking of the policies according to the social welfare functions 
 
GSW-Ranking PAGSW-Ranking 
Income support 
mechanism 
Tax rule Coverage 
Income support 
mechanism 
Tax rule Coverage 
UBI+WS P 0.75 UBI P 1 
UBI P 0.5 UBI F 1 
UBI P 0.75 UBI P 0.75 
WS P 0.75 GMI F 1 
UBI+WS P 0.5 GMI P 1 
WS P 0.5 UBI F 0.75 
UBI P 1 UBI+WS P 1 
GMI+WS P 0.5 UBI P 0.5 
GMI+WS P 0.75 UBI+WS F 1 
WS P 1 GMI+WS P 1 
WS F 1 GMI P 0.75 
UBI F 0.75 UBI+WS P 0.75 
UBI F 1 UBI F 0.5 
UBI+WS F 1 GMI F 0.75 
UBI F 0.5 GMI+WS F 1 
GMI P 0.5 UBI+WS F 0.75 
WS F 0.75 GMI+WS P 0.75 
BI+WS F 0.75 GMI P 0.5 
GMI+WS F 1 UBI+WS P 0.5 
GMI+WS F 0.75 GMI+WS F 0.75 
WS F 0.5 WS P 1 
GMI P 0.75 GMI F 0.5 
UBI+WS F 0.5 UBI+WS F 0.5 
UBI+WS P 1 GMI+WS P 0.5 
GMI+WS P 1 WS P 0.75 
GMI+WS F 0.5 WS F 1 
GMI F 0.75 GMI+WS F 0.5 
CURRENT   WS 
GMI F 1 WS P 0.5 
GMI F 0.5 CURRENT 
GMI P 1 WS F 0.5 
 Table 6. Effects of policy attributes on Social Welfare 
Regression coefficients (t-Statistics in parenthesis) 
 
 GSW PAGSW 
Constant 94233.08 (12.22) 88787.22 (70.80) 
Progressive     12.37 (3.37)    457.59  (1.32) 
Coverage     87.22 (2.37) 8260.96 (2.19) 
Coverage2     -65.46 (-2.48) -2995.58 (-1.11) 
Unconditional     16.49 (4.72)  274.49 (0.77) 
Subsidy      2.16 (0.62)  -1944.72  (-5.43) 
Note to Table 3: 
Progressive = 1 if tax rule is progressive (0 otherwise) 
Coverage = the value of a as defined in Section 2 (for the CURRENT system we 
set a = 0.1); 
Coverage2 = Coverage squared; 
Unconditional = 1 if income support mechanism is UBI or UBI+WS (0 
otherwise); 
Subsidy = 1 if income support mechanism is WS or UBI+WS or GMI+WS (0 
otherwise). 
  
 Table 7. Behavioural, fiscal and welfare effects of the policies 
 
T
ra
ns
fe
r 
an
d/
or
 
su
bs
id
y 
T
ax
 r
ul
e
 
C
ov
er
ag
e male average 
annual  
hours of work 
female average 
annual  
hours of work 
Average annual 
 disposable  
income 
top marginal 
 tax rate 
Average annual  
transfer 
 and/or subsidy 
proportion  
of winners 
head-count 
poverty ratio  
(%) 
GMI F 0.5 1965 965 26448 0.31 2316 0.54 3.09 
GMI F 0.75 1963 957 26364 0.37 3228 0.53 0.93 
GMI F 1 1960 948 26244 0.45 4272 0.47 0.01 
GMI P 0.5 1965 965 26400 0.46 2316 0.64 2.50 
GMI P 0.75 1963 957 26304 0.48 3228 0.58 0.84 
GMI P 1 1959 947 26076 0.51 4272 0.48 0.01 
GMI+WS F 0.5 1966 972 26556 0.36 4872 0.58 3.90 
GMI+WS F 0.75 1965 969 26520 0.40 5220 0.62 2.79 
GMI+WS F 1 1964 965 26448 0.45 5604 0.61 1.55 
GMI+WS P 0.5 1966 973 26496 0.48 4860 0.68 3.44 
GMI+WS P 0.75 1965 969 26472 0.49 5220 0.67 2.31 
GMI+WS P 1 1963 965 26304 0.51 5592 0.60 0.81 
UBI F 0.5 1963 964 26460 0.41 6816 0.61 0.88 
UBI F 0.75 1961 956 26352 0.50 9768 0.58 0.06 
UBI F 1 1958 948 26208 0.60 12720 0.54 0.00 
UBI P 0.5 1963 965 26388 0.51 6816 0.66 0.52 
UBI P 0.75 1960 956 26232 0.55 9768 0.61 0.04 
UBI P 1 1956 947 26040 0.60 12720 0.57 0.00 
UBI+WS F 0.5 1966 971 26556 0.38 7176 0.60 3.32 
UBI+WS F 0.75 1965 967 26520 0.42 8640 0.63 1.97 
UBI+WS F 1 1963 963 26472 0.47 10116 0.62 0.73 
UBI+WS P 0.5 1965 972 26508 0.50 7176 0.70 2.53 
UBI+WS P 0.75 1963 969 26496 0.51 8640 0.69 0.90 
UBI+WS P 1 1960 962 26220 0.54 10092 0.57 0.23 
WS F 0.5 1968 979 26676 0.34 4236 0.62 4.64 
WS F 0.75 1967 979 26676 0.36 4224 0.63 4.16 
WS F 1 1967 979 26688 0.39 4224 0.66 3.65 
WS P 0.5 1967 980 26616 0.46 4224 0.70 4.19 
WS P 0.75 1967 980 26676 0.47 4224 0.72 3.63 
WS P 1 1966 979 26580 0.48 4224 0.68 3.02 
CURRENT 1968 973 26292 0.45 1212 -- 4.23 
